项目文件夹

文件
wehub-resource-sync bf9395e022
CI / license-header (push) Has been skipped
CI / e2e-dry-run (push) Has been skipped
CI / fast-gate (push) Failing after 0s
Test PR Label Logic / test-pr-labels (push) Failing after 1s
Skill Format Check / check-format (push) Failing after 2s
CI / security (push) Failing after 5s
CI / unit-test (push) Has been skipped
CI / lint (push) Has been skipped
CI / script-test (push) Has been skipped
CI / deterministic-gate (push) Has been skipped
CI / coverage (push) Has been skipped
CI / results (push) Has been cancelled
CI / deadcode (push) Has been cancelled
CI / e2e-live (push) Has been cancelled
chore: import upstream snapshot with attribution
2026-07-13 12:22:54 +08:00

585 行
21 KiB
Go

此文件含有模棱两可的 Unicode 字符
此文件含有可能会与其他字符混淆的 Unicode 字符。 如果您是想特意这样的,可以安全地忽略该警告。 使用 Escape 按钮显示他们。
// Copyright (c) 2026 Lark Technologies Pte. Ltd.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package apps
import (
"context"
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
)
type fakeAppsHTMLPublishClient struct {
resp *htmlPublishResponse
err error
calls []string
}
func (f *fakeAppsHTMLPublishClient) HTMLPublish(ctx context.Context, appID string, tarball *htmlPublishTarball) (*htmlPublishResponse, error) {
f.calls = append(f.calls, appID)
if f.err != nil {
return nil, f.err
}
return f.resp, nil
}
func writeAppsSampleSite(t *testing.T) string {
t.Helper()
dir := t.TempDir()
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "index.html"), []byte("<html></html>"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write fixture: %v", err)
}
return dir
}
func TestRunHTMLPublish_HappyPath(t *testing.T) {
site := writeAppsSampleSite(t)
fake := &fakeAppsHTMLPublishClient{
resp: &htmlPublishResponse{URL: "https://miaoda/app_x"},
}
out, err := runHTMLPublish(context.Background(), newTestFIO(), fake, appsHTMLPublishSpec{AppID: "app_x", Path: site})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("err=%v", err)
}
if out["url"] != "https://miaoda/app_x" {
t.Fatalf("url=%v", out["url"])
}
if len(fake.calls) != 1 || fake.calls[0] != "app_x" {
t.Fatalf("calls=%v", fake.calls)
}
}
func TestRunHTMLPublish_OnlyURLInEnvelope(t *testing.T) {
// Pin 概要设计 §5.3 不变量 4 "同步语义不会变成异步":
// envelope 只含 url,未来若有人加 status / release_id 字段会被这个测试拦截。
site := writeAppsSampleSite(t)
fake := &fakeAppsHTMLPublishClient{
resp: &htmlPublishResponse{URL: "https://miaoda/app_x"},
}
out, err := runHTMLPublish(context.Background(), newTestFIO(), fake, appsHTMLPublishSpec{AppID: "app_x", Path: site})
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("err=%v", err)
}
if len(out) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("envelope should only contain 'url', got %d keys: %v", len(out), out)
}
if _, ok := out["url"]; !ok {
t.Fatalf("envelope missing 'url': %v", out)
}
}
func TestRunHTMLPublish_ClientErrorPropagated(t *testing.T) {
site := writeAppsSampleSite(t)
wantErr := errors.New("server timeout")
fake := &fakeAppsHTMLPublishClient{err: wantErr}
_, err := runHTMLPublish(context.Background(), newTestFIO(), fake, appsHTMLPublishSpec{AppID: "app_x", Path: site})
if !errors.Is(err, wantErr) {
t.Fatalf("err=%v", err)
}
}
func TestRunHTMLPublish_PathNotFound(t *testing.T) {
fake := &fakeAppsHTMLPublishClient{}
_, err := runHTMLPublish(context.Background(), newTestFIO(), fake, appsHTMLPublishSpec{AppID: "app_x", Path: "/nonexistent"})
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error")
}
if len(fake.calls) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("client should not be called when path invalid")
}
}
func TestRunHTMLPublish_DirRequiresIndexHTML(t *testing.T) {
// 目录形态:缺 index.html 应该被拦
dir := t.TempDir()
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "foo.html"), []byte("<html></html>"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
fake := &fakeAppsHTMLPublishClient{}
_, err := runHTMLPublish(context.Background(), newTestFIO(), fake, appsHTMLPublishSpec{AppID: "app_x", Path: dir})
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error for missing index.html")
}
problem := requireAppsValidationProblem(t, err)
if !strings.Contains(problem.Message, "index.html") {
t.Fatalf("message missing 'index.html': %v", problem.Message)
}
if problem.Hint == "" {
t.Fatalf("expected non-empty hint")
}
if len(fake.calls) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("client should not be called when index.html missing")
}
}
func TestRunHTMLPublish_DirWithIndexHTMLPasses(t *testing.T) {
// 目录含 index.html 应该正常走完
dir := t.TempDir()
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "index.html"), []byte("<html></html>"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write fixture: %v", err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "extra.html"), []byte("<html></html>"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write fixture: %v", err)
}
fake := &fakeAppsHTMLPublishClient{resp: &htmlPublishResponse{URL: "https://miaoda/app_x"}}
if _, err := runHTMLPublish(context.Background(), newTestFIO(), fake, appsHTMLPublishSpec{AppID: "app_x", Path: dir}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("err=%v", err)
}
if len(fake.calls) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("client should be called when index.html present")
}
}
func TestRunHTMLPublish_SingleFileRejectedIfNotNamedIndex(t *testing.T) {
// 单文件形态:文件名不是 index.html 也要拦
dir := t.TempDir()
single := filepath.Join(dir, "foo.html")
if err := os.WriteFile(single, []byte("<html></html>"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write fixture: %v", err)
}
fake := &fakeAppsHTMLPublishClient{}
_, err := runHTMLPublish(context.Background(), newTestFIO(), fake, appsHTMLPublishSpec{AppID: "app_x", Path: single})
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("single-file path 'foo.html' should be rejected (not named index.html)")
}
requireAppsValidationProblem(t, err)
if len(fake.calls) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("client must not be called when index.html missing")
}
}
func TestRunHTMLPublish_SingleFileNamedIndexPasses(t *testing.T) {
// 单文件形态:文件名恰好就是 index.html → 放行
dir := t.TempDir()
single := filepath.Join(dir, "index.html")
if err := os.WriteFile(single, []byte("<html></html>"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write fixture: %v", err)
}
fake := &fakeAppsHTMLPublishClient{resp: &htmlPublishResponse{URL: "https://miaoda/app_x"}}
if _, err := runHTMLPublish(context.Background(), newTestFIO(), fake, appsHTMLPublishSpec{AppID: "app_x", Path: single}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("err=%v", err)
}
if len(fake.calls) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("client should be called for single index.html")
}
}
func TestRunHTMLPublish_RejectsOversizeTarball(t *testing.T) {
// 把上限调到 100 字节验证拦截,defer 恢复原值避免污染其它测试。
orig := maxHTMLPublishTarballBytes
maxHTMLPublishTarballBytes = 100
defer func() { maxHTMLPublishTarballBytes = orig }()
dir := t.TempDir()
// 写 index.html(满足新加的 index 校验)+ 大文件超 100 字节上限。
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "index.html"), []byte("<html></html>"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "big.html"),
[]byte(strings.Repeat("x", 4096)), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
fake := &fakeAppsHTMLPublishClient{}
_, err := runHTMLPublish(context.Background(), newTestFIO(), fake, appsHTMLPublishSpec{AppID: "app_x", Path: dir})
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected oversize error")
}
problem := requireAppsValidationProblem(t, err)
if !strings.Contains(problem.Message, "exceeds") {
t.Fatalf("message missing 'exceeds': %v", problem.Message)
}
if problem.Hint == "" {
t.Fatalf("expected non-empty hint")
}
if len(fake.calls) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("client should not be called when tarball oversize")
}
}
func TestMaxHTMLPublishTarballBytes_Default(t *testing.T) {
// Pin 20MB 常量值,typo 到 20*1000*1024 之类会被拦截。
if maxHTMLPublishTarballBytes != 20*1024*1024 {
t.Fatalf("default = %d, want %d (20MiB)", maxHTMLPublishTarballBytes, 20*1024*1024)
}
}
func TestAppsHTMLPublish_RequiresAppID(t *testing.T) {
site := writeAppsSampleSite(t)
factory, stdout, _ := newAppsExecuteFactory(t)
err := runAppsShortcut(t, AppsHTMLPublish,
[]string{"+html-publish", "--path", site}, factory, stdout)
// cobra Required:true may report flag name without "--" prefix
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "app-id") {
t.Fatalf("expected --app-id required, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestAppsHTMLPublish_RequiresPath(t *testing.T) {
factory, stdout, _ := newAppsExecuteFactory(t)
err := runAppsShortcut(t, AppsHTMLPublish,
[]string{"+html-publish", "--app-id", "app_x"}, factory, stdout)
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "path") {
t.Fatalf("expected --path required, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestAppsHTMLPublish_DryRunPrintsManifest(t *testing.T) {
// 这个用例走真实 shortcut → 真实 LocalFileIOcwd-bounded)。
// 必须 chdir 进 tmp 用相对路径,否则 SafeInputPath 会拒绝绝对 --path。
dir := t.TempDir()
cwd, err := os.Getwd()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("getwd: %v", err)
}
if err := os.Chdir(dir); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("chdir: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.Chdir(cwd) })
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(dir, "dist"), 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("mkdir dist: %v", err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "dist", "index.html"), []byte("<html></html>"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
factory, stdout, _ := newAppsExecuteFactory(t)
if err := runAppsShortcut(t, AppsHTMLPublish,
[]string{"+html-publish", "--app-id", "app_x", "--path", "./dist", "--dry-run", "--as", "user"},
factory, stdout); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("dry-run err=%v", err)
}
got := stdout.String()
if !strings.Contains(got, "/open-apis/spark/v1/apps/app_x/upload_and_release_html_code") {
t.Fatalf("dry-run missing endpoint: %s", got)
}
if !strings.Contains(got, "index.html") {
t.Fatalf("dry-run missing file list: %s", got)
}
}
// TestAppsHTMLPublish_CleanCwdIsAllowed pins the post-PR behavior change:
// --path "." is no longer hard-rejected by Validate. A clean cwd (no
// credential files) is a valid publish target.
func TestAppsHTMLPublish_CleanCwdIsAllowed(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
cwd, err := os.Getwd()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("getwd: %v", err)
}
if err := os.Chdir(dir); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("chdir: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.Chdir(cwd) })
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "index.html"), []byte("<html></html>"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
factory, stdout, _ := newAppsExecuteFactory(t)
if err := runAppsShortcut(t, AppsHTMLPublish,
[]string{"+html-publish", "--app-id", "app_x", "--path", ".", "--dry-run", "--as", "user"},
factory, stdout); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("dry-run with --path . should pass when cwd is clean, got err=%v", err)
}
}
// TestAppsHTMLPublish_SensitiveBlocksValidate pins the new behavior: a credential
// file under --path causes Validate to reject before either DryRun or Execute
// runs, so dry-run also returns non-zero (unlike the previous advisory-warning
// model).
func TestAppsHTMLPublish_SensitiveBlocksValidate(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
cwd, err := os.Getwd()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("getwd: %v", err)
}
if err := os.Chdir(dir); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("chdir: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.Chdir(cwd) })
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(dir, "dist"), 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("mkdir: %v", err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "dist", "index.html"), []byte("<html></html>"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "dist", ".env"), []byte("API_KEY=secret"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write .env: %v", err)
}
// Dry-run path: must also fail (this is the whole point of moving the
// check into Validate — dry-run can no longer say "OK" when Execute would
// reject).
factory, stdout, _ := newAppsExecuteFactory(t)
err = runAppsShortcut(t, AppsHTMLPublish,
[]string{"+html-publish", "--app-id", "app_x", "--path", "./dist", "--dry-run", "--as", "user"},
factory, stdout)
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("dry-run with sensitive file should fail")
}
problem := requireAppsValidationProblem(t, err)
if !strings.Contains(problem.Message, ".env") {
t.Fatalf("error message should list the offending file, got %q", problem.Message)
}
if !strings.Contains(problem.Hint, "--allow-sensitive") {
t.Fatalf("error hint should mention --allow-sensitive escape hatch, got %q", problem.Hint)
}
}
// TestAppsHTMLPublish_AllowSensitiveOverride pins that --allow-sensitive
// bypasses the credential-file check (legitimate cases like a docs site
// shipping an example .env on purpose).
func TestAppsHTMLPublish_AllowSensitiveOverride(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
cwd, err := os.Getwd()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("getwd: %v", err)
}
if err := os.Chdir(dir); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("chdir: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.Chdir(cwd) })
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(dir, "dist"), 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("mkdir: %v", err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "dist", "index.html"), []byte("<html></html>"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "dist", ".env.example"), []byte("API_KEY=replace-me"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write .env.example: %v", err)
}
factory, stdout, _ := newAppsExecuteFactory(t)
if err := runAppsShortcut(t, AppsHTMLPublish,
[]string{"+html-publish", "--app-id", "app_x", "--path", "./dist", "--dry-run", "--allow-sensitive", "--as", "user"},
factory, stdout); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("--allow-sensitive should bypass the credential scan, got err=%v", err)
}
got := stdout.String()
// Dry-run output surfaces the waived list so the caller still sees what
// was let through.
if !strings.Contains(got, "sensitive_waived") {
t.Fatalf("dry-run output should record the waived credential file under --allow-sensitive, got: %s", got)
}
if !strings.Contains(got, ".env.example") {
t.Fatalf("waived list should name the file, got: %s", got)
}
}
// TestAppsHTMLPublish_SensitiveBlocksWhenPathIsCredentialParentDir pins that
// the credential-file scan still rejects when --path itself is the
// conventional parent dir (e.g. ./.aws, ./.docker, ./.kube). Without joining
// the candidate back to its absolute path, walker would strip the parent
// segment via filepath.Rel and the cloud-SDK matchers — which anchor on
// parent/file pairs — would silently pass.
func TestAppsHTMLPublish_SensitiveBlocksWhenPathIsCredentialParentDir(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
parent string
fileName string
wantSubstr string
}{
{"aws_credentials", ".aws", "credentials", "credentials"},
{"docker_config_json", ".docker", "config.json", "config.json"},
{"kube_config", ".kube", "config", "config"},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
cwd, err := os.Getwd()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("getwd: %v", err)
}
if err := os.Chdir(dir); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("chdir: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.Chdir(cwd) })
root := filepath.Join(dir, tc.parent)
if err := os.MkdirAll(root, 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("mkdir: %v", err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, tc.fileName), []byte("fake credential"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(root, "index.html"), []byte("<html></html>"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write index: %v", err)
}
factory, stdout, _ := newAppsExecuteFactory(t)
err = runAppsShortcut(t, AppsHTMLPublish,
[]string{"+html-publish", "--app-id", "app_x", "--path", "./" + tc.parent, "--dry-run", "--as", "user"},
factory, stdout)
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected rejection when --path is %s/ (would leak %s), got success", tc.parent, tc.fileName)
}
problem := requireAppsValidationProblem(t, err)
if !strings.Contains(problem.Message, tc.wantSubstr) {
t.Fatalf("error message should name the leaked file, got %q", problem.Message)
}
})
}
}
// TestAppsHTMLPublish_SensitiveBlocksWhenPathIsCredentialFileItself pins the
// single-file form: --path pointing directly at a credential file (e.g.
// ./.aws/credentials) must also reject. Walker's single-file branch sets
// RelPath = filepath.Base(rootPath), so the .aws segment is lost the same way.
func TestAppsHTMLPublish_SensitiveBlocksWhenPathIsCredentialFileItself(t *testing.T) {
dir := t.TempDir()
cwd, err := os.Getwd()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("getwd: %v", err)
}
if err := os.Chdir(dir); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("chdir: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.Chdir(cwd) })
if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Join(dir, ".aws"), 0o755); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("mkdir: %v", err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, ".aws", "credentials"), []byte("fake credential"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
factory, stdout, _ := newAppsExecuteFactory(t)
err = runAppsShortcut(t, AppsHTMLPublish,
[]string{"+html-publish", "--app-id", "app_x", "--path", "./.aws/credentials", "--dry-run", "--as", "user"},
factory, stdout)
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected rejection when --path points directly at .aws/credentials, got success")
}
problem := requireAppsValidationProblem(t, err)
if !strings.Contains(problem.Message, "credentials") {
t.Fatalf("error message should name the leaked file, got %q", problem.Message)
}
}
// TestSensitiveCandidatesError_Truncation pins the inline-list truncation so a
// payload with many credential files (e.g. an accidentally-copied tree of
// per-stage .env.* files) produces a readable, length-bounded error.
func TestSensitiveCandidatesError_Truncation(t *testing.T) {
hits := []string{"a.env", "b.env", "c.env", "d.env", "e.env", "f.env", "g.env"}
err := sensitiveCandidatesError(hits)
msg := requireAppsValidationProblem(t, err).Message
if !strings.Contains(msg, "7 credential file(s)") {
t.Fatalf("message should report the full count, got %q", msg)
}
if !strings.Contains(msg, "and 2 more") {
t.Fatalf("message should truncate beyond %d entries, got %q", maxSensitiveListInError, msg)
}
// Pin: the truncated tail is NOT spelled out.
if strings.Contains(msg, "g.env") {
t.Fatalf("message should not list entries past the truncation, got %q", msg)
}
}
func TestRunHTMLPublish_RejectsOversizeRawCandidates(t *testing.T) {
orig := maxHTMLPublishRawBytes
maxHTMLPublishRawBytes = 100
defer func() { maxHTMLPublishRawBytes = orig }()
dir := t.TempDir()
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "index.html"), []byte("<html></html>"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "big.html"), []byte(strings.Repeat("x", 4096)), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
fake := &fakeAppsHTMLPublishClient{}
_, err := runHTMLPublish(context.Background(), newTestFIO(), fake,
appsHTMLPublishSpec{AppID: "app_x", Path: dir})
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected raw-size cap to fire")
}
problem := requireAppsValidationProblem(t, err)
if !strings.Contains(problem.Message, "raw") || !strings.Contains(problem.Message, "bytes") {
t.Fatalf("expected message to explain raw-byte cap, got %q", problem.Message)
}
if len(fake.calls) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("client must not be called when raw cap hit")
}
}
func TestOversizeHTMLFiles(t *testing.T) {
orig := maxHTMLPublishSingleHTMLFileBytes
maxHTMLPublishSingleHTMLFileBytes = 100
defer func() { maxHTMLPublishSingleHTMLFileBytes = orig }()
cands := []htmlPublishCandidate{
{RelPath: "index.html", Size: 50},
{RelPath: "big.html", Size: 4096},
{RelPath: "BIG.HTML", Size: 4096}, // 大小写不敏感
{RelPath: "huge.png", Size: 9000}, // 非 .html,忽略
}
hits := oversizeHTMLFiles(cands)
if len(hits) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("hits=%v, want [big.html BIG.HTML]", hits)
}
for _, h := range hits {
if h == "huge.png" || h == "index.html" {
t.Fatalf("unexpected hit %q", h)
}
}
}
func TestMaxHTMLPublishSingleHTMLFileBytes_Default(t *testing.T) {
if maxHTMLPublishSingleHTMLFileBytes != 10*1024*1024 {
t.Fatalf("default=%d, want %d (10MiB)", maxHTMLPublishSingleHTMLFileBytes, 10*1024*1024)
}
}
func TestRunHTMLPublish_RejectsOversizeHTMLFile(t *testing.T) {
orig := maxHTMLPublishSingleHTMLFileBytes
maxHTMLPublishSingleHTMLFileBytes = 100
defer func() { maxHTMLPublishSingleHTMLFileBytes = orig }()
dir := t.TempDir()
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "index.html"), []byte("<html></html>"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "big.html"), []byte(strings.Repeat("x", 4096)), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
fake := &fakeAppsHTMLPublishClient{}
_, err := runHTMLPublish(context.Background(), newTestFIO(), fake, appsHTMLPublishSpec{AppID: "app_x", Path: dir})
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected per-file oversize error")
}
problem := requireAppsValidationProblem(t, err)
if !strings.Contains(problem.Message, "big.html") || !strings.Contains(problem.Message, "10MB") {
t.Fatalf("message=%q, want contains 'big.html' and '10MB'", problem.Message)
}
if problem.Hint == "" {
t.Fatalf("expected non-empty hint")
}
if len(fake.calls) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("client must not be called when an HTML file is oversize")
}
}
func TestRunHTMLPublish_IgnoresOversizeNonHTML(t *testing.T) {
// 单 .html 上限调小,但超限文件是 .png → 不被本护栏拦截,正常发布。
orig := maxHTMLPublishSingleHTMLFileBytes
maxHTMLPublishSingleHTMLFileBytes = 100
defer func() { maxHTMLPublishSingleHTMLFileBytes = orig }()
dir := t.TempDir()
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "index.html"), []byte("<html></html>"), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "big.png"), []byte(strings.Repeat("x", 4096)), 0o644); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("write: %v", err)
}
fake := &fakeAppsHTMLPublishClient{resp: &htmlPublishResponse{URL: "https://miaoda/app_x"}}
if _, err := runHTMLPublish(context.Background(), newTestFIO(), fake, appsHTMLPublishSpec{AppID: "app_x", Path: dir}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("non-html oversize must not be blocked by the .html cap: %v", err)
}
if len(fake.calls) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("client should be called; calls=%v", fake.calls)
}
}